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Is the consideration of better and worse alternatives to reality advantageous to
mood after a positive outcome?
Abstract
Counterfactual thinking involves reflecting on how a given outcome may have been different. Such
thoughts are centred on how the outcome could have been better (upward counterfactuals) or worse
(downward counterfactuals), with most previous research focusing on a specified direction of these
thoughts in response to a negative outcome. The current research explored how considering either one or
both directions of counterfactuals after a positive outcome in an anagram task may be related to changes
in affect and subsequent task performance. Undergraduate psychology students (N = 86) either imagined
only better or worse counterfactual alternatives in response to their anagram task performance, or
considered both better and worse alternatives. Mood ratings before and after counterfactual generation
were assessed, with self-efficacy, preparedness, and task performance also examined. Mood ratings
significantly declined in the upward only and downward followed by upward conditions, with no change
occurring in the downward only or downward last conditions. Upward counterfactuals also resulted in a
significant increase in the proportion of time for anagram task completion. The findings demonstrate that
the expected preparedness effects of counterfactual generation did not prevail after a positive outcome,
and that a recency effect on mood occurs for the last counterfactual generated.
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Abstract
Counterfactual thinking involves reflecting on how a
given outcome may have been different. Such thoughts
are centred on how the outcome could have been better
(upward counterfactuals) or worse (downward
counterfactuals), with most previous research focusing
on a specified direction of these thoughts in response to a
negative outcome. The current research explored how
considering either one or both directions of
counterfactuals after a positive outcome in an anagram
task may be related to changes in affect and subsequent
task performance. Undergraduate psychology students (N
= 86) either imagined only better or worse counterfactual
alternatives in response to their anagram task
performance, or considered both better and worse
alternatives. Mood ratings before and after counterfactual
generation
were
assessed,
with
self-efficacy,
preparedness, and task performance also examined.
Mood ratings significantly declined in the upward only
and downward followed by upward conditions, with no
change occurring in the downward only or downward
last conditions. Upward counterfactuals also resulted in a
significant increase in the proportion of time for anagram
task completion. The findings demonstrate that the
expected preparedness effects of counterfactual
generation did not prevail after a positive outcome, and
that a recency effect on mood occurs for the last
counterfactual generated.

After experiencing a somewhat positive outcome, have
you ever thought about how this outcome could have
been even better or how it could have been worse, had
some factor been different? This type of thinking is
referred to as counterfactual thinking, and is a common
mental phenomenon occurring in everyday life. It is a
process of inner reflection as to how any given outcome
may have turned out differently if some alternative
event had occurred (Bryne, 2002; Roese, 1994; Roese
& Olson, 1995). Counterfactual thinking thus requires
the attribution of causality to a real or hypothetical
antecedent in order to bring about the imagined change
in the consequent (e.g. Roese, 1994; Roese & Olson,
1995). Such thinking enables people to evaluate the

outcomes of their experiences by comparing possible
alternatives to reality (Boninger, Gleicher, &
Strathman, 1994). For example, ‘If I had not missed the
lectures on reasoning, I could have got an A in the final
exam instead of a B’. As this thought focuses on how
the outcome could have been better, it is referred to as
an upward counterfactual. Research has shown that
such thoughts tend to result in a decline in affect and a
greater sense of preparedness for a similar future event
(Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993;
Roese, 1994; Sanna, Meier & Wegner, 2001).
On the other hand, reflective thoughts pertaining to
how a given outcome may have been worse are known
as downward counterfactuals. For example, ‘If I had
missed even more lectures, I could have got a C or a D
in the exam’. These types of thoughts have a tendency
to improve one’s mood at the expense of no greater
sense of preparedness for a similar future occurrence
(Boninger et al., 1994; Roese, 1997).
Although the literature clearly demonstrates the effect
of upward counterfactuals on affect and preparedness,
mixed results have been observed for downward
counterfactuals. The majority of research has found that
mood significantly improves after downward
counterfactual generation, generally in response to a
negative outcome (c.f. Roese, 1994; Sanna, 1996).
However, several studies documented in the literature
have not found evidence for mood improvement after
the generation of downward counterfactuals (e.g.
Mandel, 2003).
Previous research examining the effect of
counterfactual thinking on mood has required
participants to either a) explicitly generate a particular
direction of counterfactual (i.e. upward or downward)
(e.g. Mandel, 2003) or b) to generate counterfactuals
spontaneously (e.g. Roese & Hur, 1997). However, no
published research to date has examined how the
consideration of both upward and downward
counterfactuals (dual counterfactual generation) as
compared to the consideration of a single direction of
counterfactual, affects mood and preparedness. Zuchetti
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and Chan (2009) conducted an exploratory study to
assess how single versus dual counterfactual generation
affected mood. Participants were required to a) read a
hypothetical scenario and b) generate a scenario
pertaining to their past experience. In the predetermined scenario task (outcome perceived as
neutral), the expected effects on mood were found:
mood declined after upward counterfactuals, improved
after downward counterfactuals, and remained
relatively neutral after considering both directions of
counterfactuals. In the self-generated scenario task
however (outcome perceived as positive), there was no
significant change in mood after the generation of
downward counterfactuals and in the dual
counterfactual conditions, a recency effect was apparent
for the last counterfactual generated.

The Present Experiment
The current experiment was an extension and
adaptation of the anagram task conducted by Roese
(1994, Exp. 3). As the majority of empirical research in
this field has focused on negative outcomes (e.g.
Boninger et al., 1994; Mandel, 2003; Roese, 1994) our
first aim was to examine how the application of
counterfactual thinking after a positive outcome affects
mood and preparedness. A positive outcome in the
current anagram task was achieved through
manipulating participants’ perception of how they
performed in an anagram task compared to the other
participants who had supposedly already completed the
task. Employing a positive outcome enabled the
exploration of any parallels between counterfactual
thinking in response to positive and negative outcomes.
A second aim was to provide a comparison of the
effect of single and dual counterfactual generation on
affect and preparedness. This was accomplished
through utilising two single counterfactual conditions:
upward (how the outcome could have been better) and
downward (how the outcome could have been worse),
and two dual counterfactual conditions of upward
followed by downward counterfactuals and downward
followed by upward counterfactuals. The two dual
conditions allowed for the assessment of a recency
effect for the last counterfactual generated. Further, it
was aimed to generalise the findings of Zuchetti and
Chan (2009) in a laboratory task directly pertaining to
participants’ immediate experience. This was to provide
the same experience for all participants from which
they could generate counterfactuals, and thus ensure
task consistency.
In line with the literature, it was hypothesised that
upward counterfactuals would result in a decline in
mood and increased preparedness, and downward
counterfactuals will lead to an improvement in mood
but reduced preparedness to complete an unexpected

second anagram task. On the basis of the findings of
Zuchetti and Chan (2009), it was predicted that the
consideration of both upward and downward
counterfactuals would result in a recency effect, in that
the direction of the last counterfactual generated would
reflect the change in mood occurring in its single
direction counterpart.

Method
Participants
Eighty-six first year Psychology students from the
University of Wollongong voluntarily participated in
the experiment for partial subject credit. Sixteen
participants were excluded from data analysis for
solving less than seven anagrams correctly and
subsequently did not perceive the outcome as being
positive; three were excluded for not generating any
counterfactuals; and one was excluded for failing to
respond to the mood adjective ratings. Thus the final
sample consisted of 66 participants with a mean age of
21.67 years (SD = 7.06), ranging from 18 to 49 years.
All participants were recruited and tested in accordance
with research protocol approved by the University of
Wollongong Human Research Ethics Committee.

Design
A 2 (last counterfactual: upward vs. downward) x 2
(number of counterfactual opportunities: single vs.
dual) x 2 (mood assessment) mixed design was
employed, producing the four counterfactual conditions
to which participants were randomly assigned. Each of
the conditions consisted of approximately 17
participants (range = 15-18).
The main dependent measures included a) a general
mood assessment conducted after completion of Task 1,
and again after generating counterfactuals; b) emotion
adjective ratings before and after counterfactual
generation; c) a self-efficacy measure, rated prior to
Task 1 performance, after Task 1 completion, and again
after counterfactual generation; and d) a preparedness
measure before completing Task 2 of which participants
were initially unaware of having to complete.

Materials
A program was designed for the presentation of the
anagram task and the rating scales on a PC. The
program recorded all the relevant data for each
participant using an anonymous participant code. The
words used for the anagram task were taken from the
MRC Database and formed two blended categories, i)
animals and nature, and ii) food and body parts, with
each category consisting of ten anagrams. Word
categories were blended as pilot testing revealed a
category priming effect. Each word consisted of five
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letters and was randomly scrambled by the researcher
(e.g. storm – tmsro, and chest – hsetc).
The mood assessment measures used in this
experiment included a general mood rating scale with a
happy and sad face as polar opposites, and four 9-point
rating scales utilising the emotion adjectives of glad,
frustrated, satisfied, and disappointed (taken from
Sanna, 1996), ranging from 1 = ‘Not at all’ to 9 =
‘Very’. The self-efficacy measure adapted from Tal-or,
Boninger, and Gleicher (2004), consisted of participants
rating on a 9-point scale how good they thought they
would be (were) at the task. Participants’ preparedness
to complete the anagram task a second time was
assessed on two 9-point scales by asking ‘After
thinking about how the outcome could have been
different, how confident would you feel in doing the
task a second time?’ and ‘If you had to do the task a
second time, how ready would you feel?’

Procedure
Each participant took part in an individual session with
the experimenter present, lasting for approximately 20
minutes. After being briefed about the nature of the task
and given two practice anagrams from an unrelated
category (colour: “cbakl” and “tihwe”), instructions for
completion of the task were verbally given. Participants
had two minutes to solve each anagram, after which the
next anagram was presented. A timer was visible to
participants on the bottom of the screen for each
anagram. Based on the procedure used by Roese (1994,
Exp. 3), participants were awarded one point for each
second remaining of the two minutes for each anagram
solved correctly.
Following Roese (1994, Exp. 3) there were two
options available to help participants solve the
anagrams, each with a cost to their final score. The first
option was that participants could choose to buy one
clue for each word by pressing <C> on the keyboard.
This would provide the first letter of the solution.
Participants were told that each clue would cost them
30 points of their final score.
The second option was that participants could skip an
anagram if they found it too difficult by pressing <S>
on the keyboard. They could not go back to the
anagrams they had skipped and points were deducted
from their score based on the time spent trying to solve
the anagram. Participants were told that at the
completion of the task, they would learn how their
performance was compared to other people who had
previously completed the task. Participants could then
choose one of the two categories of words. Before
commencing the task, participants were asked to rate
their self-efficacy (Time 1).
Participants verbally stated the solution to each
anagram to which the experimenter answered ‘yes’ or

‘no’. After stating the correct solution, or after the time
had elapsed, the next anagram was displayed. After the
last anagram was solved, the participants’ final score
was displayed, along with the number of clues bought
and the number of anagrams skipped. A line graph
illustrating that the participants’ score was above
average (approximately in the 75th percentile) in a
normal distribution, compared to the other participants
who had already supposedly completed the task was
displayed. Participants were then asked to rate how they
felt about their performance in the task on five rating
scales, followed by the second self-efficacy scale.
Participants were then asked to generate
counterfactuals depending upon their condition. For
example, participants in the upward followed by
downward condition were asked, ‘Can you think of as
many ways as you can as to how your performance in
the task could have been better?’ The experimenter
wrote down the participants’ responses, and then asked
‘Now can you think of as many ways as you can as to
how your performance in the task could have been
worse?’ After generating counterfactuals, participants
were asked to rate the same mood adjectives again,
followed by the self-efficacy scale, and the two
preparedness questions.
Afterwards, participants were asked to complete an
unexpected second anagram task, using the other
category of words not chosen for Task 1. After
completing Task 2, participants were shown their
performance data, and were then verbally debriefed.

Results
Composite Mood
After coding the counterfactuals as upward or
downward and relevant to the task, Pearson correlations
were conducted on the four mood adjectives whereby it
was found that all variables were significantly
correlated in the anticipated direction at the .01 level
(levels of association ranged from .40 to .78). A
composite mood variable was thus formed by averaging
frustrated and disappointed (both reverse scored) with
glad and satisfied. To determine the change in mood
after counterfactual generation, a last counterfactual by
number of counterfactual opportunities mixed design
ANOVA was conducted on the composite mood ratings
obtained before and after counterfactual generation with
the second general mood ratings used as a covariate 1.
Significant two-way interaction was apparent
between last counterfactual and mood assessment
(F(1,61) = 14.00, p = .00), with mood significantly
1

Due to the presence of a marginally significant difference
between conditions for general mood ratings at Time 2
(F(3,62) = 2.49 p = .07), this variable was used as a covariate
in all subsequent data analyses.
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Figure 1: Changes in mean composite mood ratings.
Error bars indicate one standard error of the mean.

declining in the upward only and upward last
conditions. The mean difference of the first and second
mood ratings was .57 (p = .00), compared to -.23 (p =
.14) for the downward only and downward last
condition (see Figure 1). This finding suggests that a
recency effect is present for the last counterfactual
generated, with significant change in mood occurring
after upward generation.

Self-Efficacy and Preparedness
A last counterfactual by number of counterfactual
opportunities mixed design ANOVA was conducted on
the self-efficacy ratings at Time 1 (prior to task
completion) and Time 2 (after task completion), and as
expected, self-efficacy ratings did not vary significantly
between conditions (F(1,61) = 3.16, p = .08)2, with the
means indicating that self-efficacy increased after task
completion in all conditions (see Figure 2). To
determine if self-efficacy ratings changed after
counterfactual generation across conditions, a second
mixed design ANOVA was conducted on self-efficacy
ratings at Time 2 (after task completion) and Time 3
(after counterfactual generation). Contrary to
expectations, self-efficacy ratings did not vary across
conditions after counterfactual generation (F(1,61) =
0.78, p = .38).
A last counterfactual by number of counterfactual
opportunities factorial ANOVA was conducted on each
of the preparedness ratings, namely confidence and
readiness to complete the task a second time. No
significant interaction between conditions was found
2

Three-way interaction between last counterfactual, number
of counterfactual opportunities and the respective dependent
variable is reported for all non-significant results unless
otherwise stated.

Figure 2: Changes in mean Self-Efficacy (SE) ratings.
Error bars indicate one standard error of the mean.

for confidence (F(1,61) = 2.76, p = .10), or readiness
(F(1,61) = 0.75, p = .39) (see Table 1). Contrary to our
hypothesis and established findings, counterfactual
generation did not result in a greater sense of
preparedness for any of the counterfactual conditions.
Table 1: Mean Preparedness Ratings (with Standard
Deviations in Parentheses)
Condition
Upward
Downward
Upward/Downward
Downward/Upward

Confidence
6.35 (1.19)
7.20 (0.68)
6.50 (1.46)
7.11 (1.32)

Readiness
6.94 (1.39)
7.87 (0.74)
7.25 (1.44)
7.61 (1.33)

Performance Measures
Last counterfactual by number of counterfactual
opportunities factorial ANOVAs were conducted on
each of the performance measures. A 2-way interaction
between the number of counterfactual opportunities and
last counterfactual generated for the proportional
change in average trial time variable was found
(F(1,61) = 4.16, p = .05). Means indicate that upward
only and
upward
followed
by downward
counterfactuals resulted in the greatest change in the
proportion of time taken to complete Task 2 in relation
to Task 1. Therefore, participants who considered only
upward counterfactuals or upward followed by
downward counterfactuals took a greater amount of
time to complete the second anagram task. In
comparison, participants generating downward only or
downward followed by upward counterfactuals spent
less time completing Task 2, however the difference
was minimal (see Figure 3). No other analyses on the
performance measures of number of skips made,
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Figure 3: Proportional change in average trial time.
Error bars indicate one standard error of the mean.

Discussion
The primary aim of the current experiment was to
provide a comparison of the effect of single and dual
counterfactual generation on mood and preparedness.
This was achieved through expanding and adapting the
design of Roese (1994, Exp. 3) to examine how the
application of counterfactual thinking applies after a
positive outcome directly pertaining to participants’
immediate experience. As hypothesised and consistent
with the findings of the positive outcome scenario task
conducted by Zuchetti and Chan (2009), the generation
of upward counterfactuals evidenced the most
significant alteration in affect. In line with the literature
(e.g. Boninger et al., 1994; Markman et al., 1993;
Roese, 1997; Sanna, 1996) composite mood analyses
revealed a significant decline in affect after upward
only and upward last counterfactual generation,
suggesting that upward counterfactuals when
considered solely or last, have the most significant
effect on mood after a positive outcome.
In contrast, downward counterfactuals when
considered solely or after upward counterfactuals had
no significant effect on participants’ composite mood
ratings. Although not consistent with our initial
hypotheses or those documented in the literature that
typically involve negative outcomes (e.g., Roese, 1994;
Sanna, 1996), the findings are consistent with Mandel
(2003) in which mood improvement was not apparent
for any of the emotions examined. It thus appears that
there may be little benefit in considering and reflecting
upon the ways in which a somewhat positive outcome
may have been worse.
Consistent with our initial predictions, the change in
mood after dual counterfactual generation reflected the

mood change occurring in the single condition of the
last counterfactual generated. Thus the downward
followed by upward counterfactual condition echoed
the decline in the composite mood ratings of the upward
only condition. Similarly, the upward followed by
downward condition evidenced the lack of change
occurring in composite mood ratings in the downward
only condition. Thus a recency effect of the last
counterfactual generated is clearly demonstrated. This
finding is consistent with the results the positive
outcome scenario task in Zuchetti and Chan (2009).
No significant difference in self-rated feelings of
preparedness to complete the task a second time was
evident. This is contrary to expectation whereby it was
anticipated that the anagram task would foster a greater
sense of preparedness than a hypothetical or selfdescribed scenario task. Similarly, there was no
significant
difference
between conditions
in
participants’ self-rated feelings of self-efficacy post
counterfactual generation. This lack of difference
between conditions in preparedness and self-efficacy
ratings may be attributable to the positive outcome of
the anagram task or the experimental nature of the
research.
The performance measures also did not yield any
significant difference between conditions. The current
experiment therefore demonstrates that after a positive
outcome in a performance-oriented task, counterfactual
generation has no significant effect on quantifiable
performance measures, such as those employed in the
current research. A significant difference however, was
apparent in the amount of time taken to complete Task
2 in relation to Task 1, with upward only and upward
followed by downward counterfactuals having the
greatest increase. Hence it appears that participants’
initial reflections as to how their performance could
have been better may have had a slight impact on their
performance in the second anagram task. This impact
however, did not extend the effect to a conscious level
of participants’ performance.
Several limitations of the current research can be
identified. First, the laboratory nature of the anagram
task may not wholly equate to participants’
performance and subsequent reflections on a real life
event. This may account for the lack of a significant
difference between conditions in self-reported ratings of
preparedness and self-efficacy. Secondly, participants’
actual sense of preparedness to complete the anagram
task a second time may not have been accurately
represented in the rating scales. A final consideration
regards the uncontrollable factor of participants’ nonverbalised reflections. Although participants were
explicitly asked to generate counterfactuals in a
particular direction, they may have also considered the
other direction of counterfactual automatically, as is
likely to occur in everyday life.
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Overall, the results of the current experiment reflect
those of the positive outcome scenario task conducted
by Zuchetti and Chan (2009). Upward counterfactuals
resulted in a decline in affect and downward
counterfactuals evidenced no significant change in
affect. As for the dual counterfactual conditions, a
recency effect on mood for the last counterfactual
generated was evident. The lack of mood improvement
occurring after downward generation and the deficiency
of preparedness and self-efficacy effects may be
attributable to the positive outcome of the anagram task.
The current research has therefore demonstrated that
thinking counterfactually after a positive outcome does
not result in the same preparedness effects as after a
negative outcome (c.f. Roese, 1994).
The current research replicated the general findings
of the positive outcome scenario task of Zuchetti and
Chan (2009) utilising an adaptation of Roese’s (1994,
Exp. 3) anagram task with a positive outcome. This has
assisted in clarifying the recency effect for the last
counterfactual generated. However, future research
would further elucidate the effect of dual counterfactual
generation on mood and preparedness by replicating the
design of the current experiment and employ a negative
outcome.
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